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FOREIGN MONOPOLIES AND TARIFF AGREEMENTS 
UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS 
 







In this paper the optimal policy and the stability of a tariff agreement among 
the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market are 
studied. To analyze the stability, the tariff agreement formation is modelled as a 
two-stage game. In the first stage each importer decides whether or not to sign 
the agreement and in the second stage the signatories and non-signatories 
choose their tariff whereas the monopoly chooses the quantity or the price. The 
findings show that the optimal policy of the importers depends on which 
strategic variable is selected by the monopolist but that, on the contrary, this 
decision has no effects on the level of cooperation that can be reached by a self-
enforcing tariff agreement that, in any case, is very low. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The idea that rent can be extracted from a foreign monopoly through a tariﬀ was developed by Katrak
(1977) and Svedberg (1979), for the case of linear demand, and in a more general framework by Brander
and Spencer (1984)1. This result is obtained assuming that the monopoly is able to discriminate among
markets and maximize proﬁt in each country separately. Another assumption the authors use is that
the importer enjoys a ﬁrst movement advantage, i.e., that the importer is the leader in a one-shot game
where the monopolist chooses the quantity and the importer the tariﬀ. In this framework a tariﬀ will
cause the consumer price of the product to rise by less than the full amount of the tariﬀ.O nn e t ,t h e
loss in consumer surplus is more than compensated by the gain in tariﬀ revenue.2
The aim of this paper is to address whether the rent-shifting hypothesis holds under an integrated
market and to investigate whether cooperation among importers through a tariﬀ agreement can improve
the welfare of the consumers of the importing countries.3 With this objective in mind we analyze the
proﬁtability and stability of a tariﬀ agreement. To analyze the stability we model the tariﬀ agreement
formation as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage each importer decides whether or not to sign the
agreement and in the second stage the signatories and non-signatories choose their tariﬀ whereas the
monopoly chooses the quantity or the price. In this second stage we consider as well two more possibilities,
that all the players take their decisions simultaneously or that the signatories enjoy a ﬁrst movement
advantage. We assume that the signing of the agreement is binding on signatories so that they acquire
ac o m m i t m e n tt os e tu pt h et a r i ﬀs stipulated by the agreement and that there are no constraints to the
entrance into the agreement.
Our ﬁndings establish that the importers’ optimal policy crucially depends on which strategic variable
1In this paper, it is shown that if demand is highly convex an import subsidy might be optimal.
2We could also quote the paper written by Bergstrom (1982) where this issue is addressed for the case of a non-
renewable resource. However, in this paper a diﬀerent approach is followed from the one adopted by the authors we have
just mentioned since Bergstrom assumes that the resource world market is an integrated market. See Brander (1995) for
a nice survey on strategic trade policy.
3The analysis of the trade policy under integrated markets has already been studied by Eaton and Grossman (1986),
Horstmann and Markusen (1986), Markusen and Venables (1988), Tanaka (1992) and Venables (1994). However, in all
these papers it is assumed that the international markets are oligolopolistic.
2is selected by the monopolist, i.e., it depends on whether the monopolist chooses the quantity or the price.
In the case of a quantity-setting monopolist a tariﬀ is always advantageous for the importers. A tariﬀ
increases the welfare of the consumers of the importing countries independently of whether they enjoy or
not a ﬁrst movement advantage, independently of the level of cooperation and independently of concavity
or convexity of demand as well. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the optimal policy of a tariﬀ agreement consists
of setting up the same tariﬀ for all the signatories so that ﬁnally all the consumers in the signatory
countries pay the same price for the good. However, in the case of a price-setting monopolist a tariﬀ is
advantageous only for the signatories and only when these act as the leader of the game in the second
stage. Moreover, in this case an import subsidy might be optimal if demand is convex. The comparison
of the two cases when the signatories act as the leader in the second stage of the game shows that a
price policy reduces the capacity of the importers to reap a part of the monopolist’s rent through a
tariﬀ.T h i sd i ﬀerence in results is explained by the fact that the monopolist faces an aggregate demand
that is diﬀerent depending if he chooses the price or if he chooses the quantity. In the ﬁrst case, the
non-signatories do not charge any tariﬀ on their imports, however, in the second case, they do. This
implies that the market conditions for the monopolist change depending on its strategic variable. Thus,
the nature of the game is not the same when the monopolist chooses the price than when it chooses
the quantity and, consequently, the outcome of the game will be diﬀerent except when all importers
are signatories. Notice that in the case of a segmented market the Stackelberg equilibrium is the same
whether the monopolist chooses the quantity or whether he chooses the price. This clearly establishes
that this disparity in results comes from the fact that no price discrimination between markets is possible
in our model. This disparity in results depending on whether the market is segmented or integrated is
not new in the literature of trade policy under imperfect competition. For instance, Horstmann and
Markusen (1986) ﬁnd for the case of an integrated market that an ad valorem production or export
subsidy has a negative eﬀect on output per ﬁrm in the domestic industry with free entry contrary to the
results obtained by Venables (1985) for a segmented-markets model.
From the study of the symmetric-linear case we ﬁnd that when the monopoly chooses the quantity
the signatories and non-signatories’s tariﬀsa r estrategic complements and that the tariﬀsi n c r e a s ew i t h
3respect to the number of signatories independently of whether the signatories enjoy or not a ﬁrst move-
ment advantage. On the contrary, an increase in the number of signatories reduces the imports. The
eﬀect on welfare depends on whether the signatories enjoy a ﬁrst movement advantage. In any case the
non-signatories’ welfare increases with the number of signatories. However, the signatories’ welfare only
increases when they act as a leader in the second stage of the game. When the monopolist chooses the
price the tariﬀ increases with the number of signatories and also the welfare both of the signatories and
of the non-signatories, however, the production of the monopoly goes down. Notice that in this case the
optimal policy of a non-signatory is to select a zero tariﬀ. Finally, it is interesting to highlight that in
all the cases an agreement beneﬁts the non-signatories more than the signatories.
As regards the scope of cooperation the results obtained for the ex-ante symmetric linear case show
that the maximum level of cooperation that can be reached by a self-enforcing tariﬀ agreement is very low
independently of the gains coming from cooperation, independently of the number of importers buying
in the international market and also independently of whether the monopolist chooses the price or the
quantity. This means that although the leadership of the signatories guarantees the proﬁtability of a
broad agreement in comparison with the case in which the signatories do not have a ﬁrst movement
advantage, the leadership is not suﬃcient to guarantee the stability. Importers are not interested in
signing an agreement because the free-rider incentives mean that being outside the agreement is the
dominant strategy in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Thus, we ﬁnd that to enjoy a strategic advantage it
is not suﬃcient to reach a broad agreement even assuming that the signing of the agreement guarantees
its full compliance.4
Since the publication of Katrak’s paper other papers have addressed the issue of the trade policy
towards a foreign monopoly. De Meza (1979) demonstrates that a price ceiling equal to the monopolist’s
constant marginal costs welfare-dominates the optimal tariﬀ deﬁned by Katrak. Jones (1987) shows that
4T h ei s s u eo fh o wt h ef o r m a t i o no fp r e f e r e n t i a lt a r i ﬀ agreements aﬀects optimal tariﬀs and welfare and also the analysis
of its stability have been extensively studied in the literature. See for instance Bagwell and Staiger (1990), Kennan and
Riezman (1990), Riezman (1991), Yi (1996), Macho-Stadler et al. (1998) and more recently Bond et al. (2004). However
the trade models used in this literature are diﬀerent from the one we use. In this paper we focus on a tariﬀ agreement
against a foreign monopolist and we do abstraction of the trade between the importers of the monopolized good.
4Brander and Spencer’s (1984) result that a country may ﬁnd it optimal to subsidize the imports is, in
general, correct in a general equilibrium framework where income eﬀects are taken into account; but
speciﬁc and ad valorem forms of taxation may yield diﬀerent results. Spencer and Jones (1992) consider
home country tariﬀ and subsidy policies in a setting where a home ﬁrm is partially dependent on a foreign
vertically integrated ﬁrm for supplies of a key input, and show that a tariﬀ on ﬁnal product imports may
cause the foreign vertically integrated ﬁrm to reduce the price charged for the input under circumstances
where a simple monopoly supplier of the input would increase its price. Other papers examine the eﬀects
of trade policy on the composition and the quality of imports which are supplied by a foreign monopolist5
or the optimal trade policy under incomplete information6. However, no contribution, to our knowledge,
has addressed the issue analyzed in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the case of a quantity-setting monopolist is
studied. First, the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium speciﬁct a r i ﬀ is characterized. In Section 1.2
the tariﬀ agreement formation as a two-stage game is modelled and in Section 1.3 the Nash equilibrium
of the tariﬀ and quantity game is obtained. In Section 1.4 the stability of a tariﬀ agreement is analyzed
for the symmetric-linear case. In the second part of the paper the case of a price-setting monopolist is
considered. In Section 2.1 the Stackelberg equilibrium of the tariﬀ and price game is obtained and in
Section 2.2 the stability of a tariﬀ agreement is analyzed again for the symmetric-linear case. Finally,
the self-enforcing tariﬀ agreement when the monopolist chooses the quantity is compared with the self-
enforcing tariﬀ agreement when the monopolist chooses the prices. Concluding remarks and issues for
future research end the paper.
5See Falvey (1979), Krishna (1987), Das and Donnenfeld (1987) and Donnefeld (1988).
6See Prusa (1990), Gresik and Nelson (1994), Collie and Hviid (1994), Bond and Gresik (1996) and Kolev and Prusa
(1999).
52 The Case of a Quantity-setting Monopolist
2.1 The Nash Equilibrium SpeciﬁcT a r i ﬀ
We shall conﬁne ourselves to a partial equilibrium model. Assuming that the representative consumer
of the importing country acts as a price-taker agent, we can write the consumer’s welfare function as
Wi = Ui(qi) − (p + ti)qi + Ri,i=1 ,...N, where N is the number of countries that buy the good under
consideration in an integrated international market. Ui(qi) is the consumer’s gross surplus, qi is the
consumption of the good, p the international price of the good, ti the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ,a n dRi a lump-sum
transfer that the consumer receives from the government. Thus, the good demand depends only on the
consumer (national) price: U0
i(qi)=p+ti so that it can be written as qi = Di(p+ti) with D0
i < 0 if the
marginal utility is decreasing.7 Then the demand in the international market is Q =
PN
i=1 Di(p + ti)









< 0,j=1 ,...,N. (1)
Assuming that the tariﬀ revenues are reimbursed to the consumers as lump-sum transfers, i.e., that
Ri = tiqi, the consumer’s welfare is given by the following expression
Wi = Ui(Di(p(Q,t)+ti)) − p(Q,t)Di(p(Q,t)+ti),i =1 ,...,N. (2)
On the other side of the market, we have a monopoly that maximizes proﬁts π =( p(Q,t)−c)Q where
c is the marginal cost of production. Thus, we face a simultaneous non-cooperative game where the
monopoly chooses the quantity according to the standard condition MR = MC, and the governments
























i stands for the derivative of the demand with respect to the consumer price.
8We focus on the case of large importers, although we surmise that the results obtained in this paper would not change
if the demand from small countries were also taken into account in the analysis. Jones and Takemori (1989) have shown
that a tariﬀ can be advantageous for a small open economy facing a foreign monopoly under an integrated market if the
average demand elasticity abroad is lower than in the small economy.
6where the ﬁrst term of the diﬀerence stands for the reduction in the utility caused by the increment in
the consumer price and the second term for the reduction in the expense. Notice that according to (1)
∂p/∂ti +1is positive, which means that the consumer price increases with the tariﬀ.
Then taking into account that U0
i −p = ti and (1), we obtain that the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ is given






> 0,i =1 ,...,N. (4)
This result was established by Karp and Newbery (1991, p.288) in the framework of a game in which
large importers who behave strategically confront competitive suppliers of a non-renewable resource. In
that paper this result is obtained assuming that exporters choose supply in each period before importers
announce their tariﬀs. Here, we show that this result also characterizes the Nash speciﬁct a r i ﬀ of a
static simultaneous game between a monopolist and the governments of the importing countries. We
would like to highlight as well that in an integrated market there is a strategic interdependence among the
diﬀerent importing countries and the monopolist that creates the condition to get a positive tariﬀ without
assuming that the importers enjoy a strategic advantage, as happens in the case of a segmented market.
Moreover, the tariﬀ is positive independently of the convexity or concavity of the demand functions.
This also establishes a diﬀerence with respect to the results obtained for the case of a segmented market.
In Brander and Spencer (1984) it is shown that imports from the foreign monopolist could be subsidized
if demand is suﬃciently convex. This is not the case with an integrated market.
2.2 Self-enforcing Tariﬀ Agreements
In this section we are interested in analyzing whether the importing countries can improve the consumer’s
welfare through a tariﬀ agreement (TA) which includes analyzing not only the proﬁtability of the agree-
ment but also its stability. To analyze the stability of a tariﬀ agreement we model the TA formation as
a two-stage game, in which in the ﬁrst stage each country decides whether or not to join the TA and
in the second stage the signatories and non-signatories determine simultaneously their tariﬀ whereas the
monopoly chooses the quantity. We describe each stage brieﬂy, in reverse order.
The Tariﬀ and Quantity Game
7Suppose that, as the outcome of the ﬁrst-stage, there are n signatory countries (a representative
signatory being denoted by s) and N − n non-signatories (a representative non-signatory being denoted
by f). Each non-signatory country takes as given the tariﬀ of all other countries and the quantity and
chooses its tariﬀ to maximize its own consumer’s welfare. Signatory countries choose tariﬀs to maximize
the aggregate consumer’s welfare of the n signatories, taking also as given the tariﬀso fn o n - s i g n a t o r i e s .
Finally, the monopoly chooses the quantity taking as given the tariﬀs of all importing countries. In other
words, in the second stage the signatories, non-signatories and the monopoly play a simultaneous game
that we call the tariﬀ and quantity game.
The outcome of this game then, is that, for any number of signatories n we can deﬁne the equilibrium
payoﬀs to signatory and non-signatory countries: Ws(n) and Wf(n).
The Membership Game
We assume that in the ﬁrst stage, countries play a simultaneous open membership game with com-
mitment. In a simultaneous open membership game, the strategies for each country are to sign or not
sign and any player is free to join the agreement. Moreover, each country chooses simultaneously one of
the two possible strategies and the agreement is formed by all players who choose to sign. Finally, we
assume that the signing of the agreement is binding on signatories so that they acquire a commitment
to set the tariﬀs stipulated in the agreement.
The concept of stability used in the paper is borrowed from the literature on cartel stability, see
d’Aspremont et al (1983), which has also been applied more recently to the analysis of the stability of
the international environmental agreements, see for instance Barrett (1994). For 2 ≤ n ≤ N we deﬁne a
self-enforcing TA as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 AT Aw i t hn signatories is stable if it satisﬁes that Ws(n) ≥ Wf(n−1) (internal stability
condition) and that Wf(n) ≥ Ws(n +1 )(external stability condition).
Internal stability simply means that any signatory country is at least as well oﬀ staying in the TA as
quitting, assuming that all other countries do not change their membership decisions. External stability
similarly requires that any non-signatory is at least as well oﬀ remaining a non-signatory than joining
the TA, again assuming that all other countries do not change their membership decisions.
8We can also think of a stable TA as a Nash equilibrium of the membership game. Suppose that
countries choose to sign or not to sign taking as given the membership decisions of all other countries
and that the outcome is that m countries sign the agreement such that 2 ≤ m ≤ N −1. Then the payoﬀs
to a country are Ws(m +1 )if it signs and Wf(m) if it does not. So it will join if Ws(m +1 )≥ Wf(m)
and not join otherwise. For a TA with n∗ members to constitute a Nash equilibrium of the membership
game, it must have paid each signatory to sign, so Ws(n∗) ≥ Wf(n∗ − 1). Similarly it must have paid
each non-signatory not to join, so Wf(n∗) ≥ Ws(n∗ +1 ) . These are precisely the conditions for internal
and external stability.
N e x t ,w ea n a l y z e dt h eN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h et a r i ﬀ and quantity game.
2.3 The Nash Equilibrium of the Tariﬀ and Quantity Game
Suppose there are n signatories and N −n non-signatories. Then the demand in the international market
is Q =
Pn
i=1 Dsi(p + tsi)+
PN−n
j=1 Dfj(p + tfj) so that the inverse demand function is represented by
p(Q,t) where now t =( ts1,...,tsn,t f1,...,tf,N−n). This does not alter expression (1), which for a signatory
















< 0,i =1 ,...,n (5)
and in a similar way for a non-signatory.
Given (5) the optimal trade policy of signatories is deﬁned by the maximization of the aggregate

















































 =0 ,l =1 ,...,n. (6)
Comparing these conditions with (3) it can be seen that now the cross-eﬀects of the tariﬀ over the
consumer’s welfare of the other signatories are taken into account to deﬁne the optimal policy of the
agreement.
9Using these conditions the following result can be obtained
Proposition 1 In an integrated market, the Nash equilibrium optimal policy of a TA consists of setting
up the same tariﬀ for all the signatories of the agreement.
Proof. As tsi = U0







sl =0 ,l =1 ,...,n, (7)

















,l , m =1 ,...,n, l 6= m.




k (tsm − tsl)=0 ,l , m =1 ,...,n, l 6= m,
that for D0
k < 0 yield tsm = tsl for l,m =1 ,...,n, l 6= m.
Based on this result we can use the F.O.C. to get an expression for the agreement tariﬀ. Reordering
































































> 0,l =1 ,...,n. (8)
10Thus we ﬁnd that the agreement tariﬀ is proportional to the aggregate demand of the agreement.
Notice that (4) is a particular case of (8), the case given by n =1that represents the fully non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium described in the previous section.
On the other hand, the non-signatories choose a tariﬀ characterized by (4) and the monopoly chooses
the quantity according to the standard condition MR= MC.
Next, we calculate the Nash equilibrium of the tariﬀ and quantity game for the case of a linear
demand function: qk = a − p − tk,k=1 ,...,N.
2.4 The Symmetric-Linear Case
2.4.1 The Nash Equilibrium of the Tariﬀ and Quantity Game
Supposing given the number of signatories, the inverse demand function is written as follows













then by substitution in the monopoly’s proﬁtf u n c t i o nw eh a v et h a t
π =
















































































,m =1 ,...,N − n. (10)
11Finally, the signatories choose the tariﬀs in order to maximize the aggregate welfare taking as given








































 − tsl =0 ,l=1 ,...,n. (11)
The solution to the game is given by reaction functions (9) and (10), and by conditions (11). Under
t h ea s s u m p t i o no fs y m m e t r yw eh a v et h a ttf1 = ... = tf(N−n) = tf and ts1 = ... = tsn = ts so that the




(a − c) −
1
2
(nts +( N − n)tf), (12)
tf =
Q + nts
N2 − N + n
, (13)
ts =
n(Q +( N − n)tf)
N2 − n2 . (14)
By visual inspection it can be established that the tariﬀsa r estrategic complementaries to each other
but strategic substitutes of the quantity.
The solution to this system is
Q =
(a − c)N(N(N − 1) − n(n − 1))








N(2N − 1) − n(n − 1)
, (17)
so that we have that ts = ntf. It is clear that tf is increasing with respect to n which establishes that
ts will be also increasing. Then the cooperation leads to higher tariﬀs both for the signatories and





(a − c)N3(2n − 1)
(N(2N − 1) − n(n − 1))2 < 0.
12Finally, we calculate the payoﬀs of the game
π =
(a − c)(N(N − 1) − n(n − 1))
N(2N − 1) − n(n − 1)
, (18)
Wf =
(a − c)2N2(N2 − 1)
2(N(2N − 1) − n(n − 1))2, (19)
Ws =
(a − c)2N2(N2 − n2)
2(N(2N − 1) − n(n − 1))2, (20)
where Ws <W f for n ≥ 2.
It is easy to check that the monopoly’s proﬁts decrease when the number of signatories increases and
that the consumer’s welfare of the non-signatory countries increases, which conﬁrms the rent-shifting




4(a − c)2N2(N(2N − 1) − n(n − 1))(N(N − n)+n3)
4(N(2N − 1) − n(n − 1))4 < 0.
The cooperation of signatories beneﬁts non-signatories but it is not proﬁtable for themselves. For this
reason we must not expect the importing countries be interested in signing a TA. The agreement does
not come about but not because it is unstable but because it is not proﬁtable. It does not increase the
consumer welfare of the importers that sign the TA.
Nevertheless, each importer will be interested in setting a tariﬀ that we can calculate making n equal





Thus, we have that the greater the number of importers and the marginal cost, the lower the tariﬀ,
whereas the bigger the country, the higher the tariﬀ.
2.4.2 The Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Tariﬀ and Quantity Game
In this section we investigate whether a ﬁrst movement advantage can make a TA proﬁtable for signatories
and what the scope of the agreement is in such case. First, it would appear appropriate to clarify the
structure and timing of the game. As in the previous section we have n signatories and N − n non-
signatories who choose the tariﬀs, and the monopolist that chooses the quantity, however now we assume
that the signatories move ﬁrst and that given the signatories’ tariﬀ the followers, the non-signatories and
13the monopolist, play a simultaneous game. If the coalition of signatories becomes the leader of the game
we can write from reaction functions (12) and (13) that
Q =
(a − c)N(N2 − (N − n)) − N2nts
2N2 − (N − n)
, (22)
tf =
(a − c)N + nts
2N2 − (N − n)
. (23)












subject to conditions (22) and (23).




2N2 − N + n
¢¡
N2 − N + n
¢
− N2n2¤
(2N2 − N + n)




2N2 − N + n
¢
(2N2 − N + n)
2 − N2n2 , (25)
ts =
(a − c)nN3
(2N2 − N + n)
2 − N2n2, (26)
where
¡
2N2 − N + n
¢¡




2N2 − N + n
¢2 − N2n2 are positive for n ≤ N. It is
easy to show that also in this case ts is higher than tf provided that N>2 and that for n = 0 (25)
yields the tariﬀ of the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.





((2N2 − N + n)





((2N2 − N + n)




N3(a − c)((N2 − 1)n2 +4 N4 − 4N3 + N2)
((2N2 − N + n)
2 − N2n2)2 > 0.
where
f(n)=N2(N2 − 1)n2 +2 N3(2N3 − N2 − 2N +1 ) n − N4(4N2 − 4N +1 )> 0,
g(n)=( N2 − 1)n2 +2 N(2N3 − N2 − 2N +1 ) n − N2(4N2 − 4N +1 )> 0,
for N>2 and n ≥ 1. These signs show that cooperation leads to an increment of the tariﬀ both for the
signatories and non-signatories. However, the imports decrease.




2N2 − N + n
¢¡
N2 − N + n
¢
− N2n2)2
((2N2 − N + n)
2 − N2n2)2 , (27)
Wf =
(a − c)
2 N2(N2 − 1)
¡
2N2 − N + n
¢2
2((2N2 − N + n)




2((2N2 − N + n)
2 − N2n2)
, (29)






2N2 − N + n
¢¡
N2 − N + n
¢
− N2n2)f(n)
((2N2 − N + n)




(a − c)2N2(N2 − 1)(2N2 − N + n)g(n)
((2N2 − N + n)




2(a − c)2N4(2n(N2 − 1) − 2N(2N − 1))
4((2N2 − N + n)
2 − N2n2)2 > 0, for n ≥ 2.
However, it is easy to show using directly (29) that Ws(2) <W s(1). This means that when there is
only one leader in the game, the leader loses by sharing its leadership with another country. However,
once the agreement consists of two countries, any new incorporation to the agreement increases the
consumer welfare of signatories. Thus, the analysis of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the tariﬀ and
quantity game shows that leadership makes the cooperation of the importing countries proﬁtable and
that the greater the number of countries in the TA, the higher the tariﬀ and the consumers’ welfare.
Moreover, the rent-shifting hypothesis holds and the proﬁts decrease as the tariﬀ increases with the
number of countries. On the other hand, we can check, using (28) and (29), that the potential gains
from full cooperation given by Ws(N) − Wf(0) increase with respect to the diﬀerence a − c and also
with respect to N, the number of countries that buy the good in the international market. Nevertheless,
proﬁtability does not guarantee that a TA takes place. For this reason, next we develop the stability
analysis of the TA.
2.4.3 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
According to Def. 1 we will say that a TA with n∗ signatories is stable if the internal and external
stability conditions are satisﬁed for n∗. Using (28) and (29) we obtain the following result
Proposition 2 For all N ≥ 3, the unique self-enforcing TA consists of three countries.
15Proof: See Appendix A
This result establishes that the stable level of cooperation is very low and that although the cooper-
ation is proﬁtable for signatories the incentives to be outside the agreement increase with the number of
signatories, reducing considerably the possibilities of reaching a TA with a large number of signatories.
Thus, we ﬁnd that for the game analyzed in this paper to enjoy a strategic advantage, it is not suﬃ-
cient to reach a broad agreement among the importers even assuming that the signing of the agreement
guarantees that the agreement is going to be respected by the signatories. Remember that we have
assumed that the importers play a simultaneous open membership game with commitment, i.e. with full
compliance of the agreement.
To illustrate this result we present a numerical example that may help the reader to better understand
how the stability conditions work and why the Nash equilibrium of the membership game yields such a
low level of cooperation when cooperation is proﬁtable for signatories.
=⇒ Table1 ⇐=
In Table 1, n =0stands for the fully non-cooperative equilibrium whereas n =1stands for the
Stackelberg equilibrium with only one country acting as a leader. First, we check for which values of n
the internal stability condition is satisﬁed. Beginning with the grand coalition we see that a signatory
gets 66.67 whereas by quitting the agreement the country would get 79.02. The grand coalition is not
a stable agreement since the countries have incentives to not sign the agreement. For an agreement
consisting of nine countries the same argument applies. A signatory gets 63.49 whereas by quitting
the agreement the country would get 72.13. We can check that this argument repeats itself until the
number of signatories is three. For three signatories the argument is the contrary. A signatory gets 55.02
whereas by quitting the agreement the country would get 54.90. Now we begin with an agreement of two
countries to check if the external stability condition is satisﬁed. For n =2 , a non-signatory gets 54.90
whereas by joining the agreement the country would get 55.02. A bilateral agreement is not stable since
the non-signatories would be interested in joining the agreement. However, for an agreement consisting
of three countries the sign of the comparison changes. A non-signatory gets 55.82 whereas by joining
16Table 1
n ts tf Q p Ws Wf π
0 1.052 94.74 19.474 54.85 897.51
1 0.55 1.050 95.00 19.500 54.97 54.57 902.50
2 1.10 1.053 94.69 19.469 54.85 54.90 896.63
I3 1.65 1.062 93.81 19.381 55.02 55.82 879.98
4 2.22 1.077 92.33 19.233 55.50 57.38 852.48
5 2.81 1.099 90.22 19.022 56.30 59.66 813.93
6 3.45 1.126 87.41 18.741 57.44 62.75 764.02
7 4.13 1.162 83.81 18.381 58.98 66.83 702.36
8 4.88 1.207 79.28 17.928 60.97 72.13 628.58
9 5.71 1.263 73.65 17.365 63.49 79.02 542.50
10 6.67 66.67 16.67 66.67 444.44
N=10,a =30,c =20
Table 2
n t p Q Ws Wf π
0 20.00 100.00 50.00 1000.00
1 0.50 19.97 99.75 50.12 50.25 994.99
2 1.01 19.90 98.99 50.50 51.01 979.90
I3 1.53 19.77 97.70 51.15 52.33 954.49
4 2.08 19.58 95.84 52.08 54.25 918.40
5 2.67 19.33 93.34 53.33 56.89 871.11
6 3.30 19.01 90.11 54.94 60.38 811.98
7 3.99 18.60 86.04 56.98 64.93 740.29
8 4.76 18.09 80.95 59.52 70.86 655.33
9 5.64 17.46 74.61 62.70 78.62 556.64
10 6.67 16.67 66.66 66.67 444.44
N=10,a =30,c =10
17the agreement the country would get 55.50. Thus, the non-signatories do not have incentives to join
the agreement. The conclusion is that there exists a unique value for n that satisﬁes both the internal
stability condition and the external stability condition. Only an agreement consisting of three countries
is self-enforcing.
Finally, we would like to comment on the case where N =2 . This a is a somewhat curious case
because the Stackelberg equilibrium when the two countries are in the agreement coincides with the
fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In fact, this is a particular case of a more general case that
establishes that the Stackelberg equilibrium for the grand coalition, independently of the number of
importers, is identical to the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium when there are only two countries.
This coincidence appears because when all the countries sign the agreement the agreement’s payoﬀ is
linear with respect to the number of countries. When all the countries sign the agreement, the agreement’s




























Thus, the optimal tariﬀ for the grand coalition is independent of the number of importers and it is
identical to the fully non-cooperative equilibrium for N =2 . See (21). Taking this into account we can
analyze the stability of the agreement when there are two large importers. For N =2we can distinguish
three situations. The ﬁrst situation could be the case in which the leadership is associated to the existence
of an agreement. Then if an agreement is not signed the payoﬀs of the importers are given by the fully
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. As we have just seen this equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the grand coalition, in this case, with the Stackelberg equilibrium of a bilateral agreement.
Then we can conclude, according to Def. 1, that the agreement is stable. The internal stability condition
is satisﬁed for the grand coalition. A second situation appears when it is assumed that if a country does
18not sign the agreement, it becomes a follower. Again the agreement is stable since the follower’s payoﬀ
is lower than the leader’s payoﬀ. The last situation appears when it is assumed that the leadership is
independent of the signing of the agreement. In this case the agreement is not stable since as we have
pointed out above if there is only one leader in the game, the leader loses by sharing its leadership with
a second country. Thus, the internal stability condition is not satisﬁed since a leader is not interested in
sharing his ﬁrst movement advantage with the other country.
3 The Case of a Price-setting Monopolist
3.1 The Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Tariﬀ and Price Game
It is pretty obvious that if importers do not enjoy a ﬁrst movement advantage the optimal tariﬀ is zero
when the monopolist chooses the price since given the price any tariﬀ will reduce the consumer’s welfare.
This can be easily checked using the following expression of the representative consumer’s surplus
Wi = Ui(Di(p + ti)) − pDi(p + ti),i =1 ,...N.
For this expression the F.O.C. yields (U0
i − p)D0
i =0which, taking into account that U0
i −p = ti,
implies that the Nash equilibrium speciﬁct a r i ﬀ is zero. Moreover, this result is independent of the degree
of cooperation among the importers.
However, if the importers build up an agreement with n signatories that act as a leader, the nature
of the game between the monopolist and the importers changes and consequently so does the optimal
commercial policy. Next, we analyze this case. As in Section 2.4.2 we assume that the signatories move
ﬁrst and that given the signatories’ tariﬀ, the non-signatories and the monopolist play a simultaneous
game. This means that, according to the argument we have just commented, the non-signatories do no








and the monopolist’s proﬁts are



































The S.O.C. for the proﬁt maximization is satisﬁed if 2
PN
k=1 D0
k +( p − c)
PN
k=1 D00
k ≤ 0. Thus, the
concavity of the national demand functions is a suﬃcient condition to obtain that the tariﬀ is a strategic
substitute of the price.


















































 =0 ,l =1 ,...,n. (31)
This condition looks like condition (6) however the partial derivative of price with respect to the tariﬀ
stands here for the slope of the monopolist’s reaction function whereas in condition (6) it stands for the
eﬀect on the inverse demand curve of a variation in the tariﬀ. This expression clearly establishes that
now the optimal policy cannot be to set up a tariﬀ equal to zero for all signatories. With leadership,
as might be expected, there is place for a strategic trade policy. The next result deﬁnes the sign of this
policy.
Proposition 3 In an integrated market if the national demand functions are concave, the optimal policy
of an importers agreement consists of setting up a tariﬀ on imports.
Proof. Taking into account that U0







l =0 ,l =1 ,...,n, (32)
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which is positive if the demand functions are concave. This allows us to conclude that tl > 0 and this
occurs for any signatory.
Notice that if the demand functions are convex enough the numerator and denominator of the previous
expression could be positive and hence the tariﬀ.
Corollary 1 If the national demand functions are linear the optimal policy is to set up the same tariﬀ
for all the signatories of the agreement.
Proof. Straightforward from (33).
The intuition behind this last result is that given the linearity of the demand function and the fact
that the monopolist is selling its output in an integrated market taking into account the demand functions
of all the importers, the marginal welfare of the tariﬀ is the same for all the signatories. This means
21that the representative consumers of all the signatory countries pay the same price for the monopolist
output. We illustrate this idea through an example for the simple case of two countries in Appendix B.





i (∂p/∂ti +1 )
which is positive for the concave case. This expression can also be written as (∂p/∂ti)qi/(∂qi/∂ti) which
coincides with expression (6’) in Brander and Spencer (1984), see page 230. However, they are not
identical since ∂p/∂ti in our paper is calculated from the aggregate demand function and in Brander
and Spencer’s paper it is calculated from one country’s demand function without taking into account
the demand functions of the rest of the countries. In other words, in an integrated market where the
monopolist sets up a unique price for its output, the optimal tariﬀ for the leader depends on the demand
functions of the other countries as well, even when the rest of countries choose a zero tariﬀ,w h e r e a si n
a segmented market this is not the case, the optimal tariﬀ, as it is established in Brander and Spencer’s
paper, depends only on the demand conditions of the leader.
Next, we develop the stability analysis for the linear case.
3.2 The Symmetric-Linear Case
3.2.1 The Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Tariﬀ and Price Game
The stability analysis we develop in this Section follows the same steps as the analysis developed in
Section 2.4.2 except that now the monopolist chooses the price instead of the quantity. Now only the
Stackelberg equilibrium is relevant since for the Nash equilibrium the importers are not interested in
charging a tariﬀ on imports.
For the linear case the aggregate demand is




and the monopolist’s proﬁts are
π =( p − c)
Ã






22so that the monopolist’s reaction function is
p =





which establishes that a tariﬀ is a strategic substitute of the price. Given this reaction function and the
fact that non-signatories select a zero tariﬀ, the optimal trade policy for signatories can be obtained from















The solution to this optimization problem yields the following results
t =
(a − c)nN
4N2 − n2 ,p =
a(2N2 − n2)+2 cN2
4N2 − n2 .
It is clear from these results that the tariﬀ increases with the number of signatories whereas the price
decreases.
Next, we calculate the payoﬀs for the monopolist, a representative non-signatory and a representative
signatory
π =
(a − c)2N(2N2 − n2)2
(4N2 − n2)2 ,
Wf =
2(a − c)2N4




where Ws <W f for n ≥ 2. From these expressions it is easy to check that the consumer’s welfare, both
for non-signatories and for signatories, increases with the number of signatories, even when there is only
one leader since Ws(1) <W s(2). On the other hand, the rent-shifting hypothesis works and the proﬁts




8(a − c)2nN3(2N2 − n2)
(4N2 − n2)3 < 0.
3.2.2 The Nash Equilibrium of the Membership Game
According to Def. 1 (34) allows us to conclude that
Proposition 4 The unique self-enforcing TA consists of two countries when N =2and of three coun-
tries when N ≥ 3.
23Proof. See Appendix C
Thus, we have the same result as in the previous case when the monopolist choses the quantity. The
logic behind this result is the same as in the previous case and we will not insist on it. Nevertheless, to
complete the exposition of this case next we will present the results of the numerical example.
=⇒ Table2 ⇐=
In this table n =0stands for the monopolist’s equilibrium and n =1t h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei so n l yo n e
importing country acting as the leader of the game. It is easy to check that for any value of n larger than
three the internal stability condition is not satisﬁed and that for n =2the external stability condition
is the condition that is not satisﬁed. For n =3both conditions hold and the agreement is self-enforcing,
any signatory is interested in leaving the agreement and any non-signatory is interested in joining the
agreement.
4 Comparing the Two Equilibria
In this last section we explore the diﬀerences between both equilibria in order to establish how the optimal
trade policy of importers is aﬀected by the strategic variable of the monopolist. A ﬁrst comment to point
out is that there is no diﬀerence between the two equilibria when the agreement consists of the grand
coalition. In that case all the countries charge a tariﬀ on imports so that the aggregate demand function
that the monopolist faces is the same independently of the monopolist’s strategic variable. However,
when there are non-signatories or, in the extreme, when all the importers act in a non-cooperative
way, the aggregate demand function is diﬀerent depending if the monopolist chooses the price or if he
chooses the quantity. In the ﬁrst case, the non-signatories do not charge any tariﬀ on their imports,
however, in the second case, they do. This means that the market conditions for the monopolist change
depending on its choice of strategic variable. Thus, this choice changes the nature of the game, the
strategic interdependence among the players, and consequently the outcome of the game will be diﬀerent
for both cases except when all importers are signatories. Nevertheless, the grand coalition is unstable
24independently of the variable chosen by the monopolist.
Next, we develop the comparative analysis for the case of a TA signed by three countries and N>3
because we think that this is the interesting case since it is the only agreement that is self-enforcing.
Using the results obtained in the previous sections we ﬁrst compare the tariﬀs, the prices, both the
international price and the national price, and the quantity.9
tQ
s − tp =
3(a − c)N(4N3 − 13N2 +6 N − 9)
((2N2 − N +3 ) 2 − 9N2)(4N2 − 9)
> 0,
pQ − pp = −
(a − c)N3(4N3 − 14N2 +2 1 N − 45)
(N(2N2 − N +3 ) 2 − 9N3)(4N2 − 9)
< 0,
pQ + tQ
s − (pp + tp)=−
(a − c)N2(4N4 − 26N3 +6 0 N2 − 63N + 27)




f − pp =
(a − c)N2(4N4 +1 0 N3 − 27N2 +5 4 N − 27)
(N(2N2 − N +3 ) 2 − 9N3)(4N2 − 9)
> 0,
QQ − Qp = −
(a − c)N3(4N3 − 14N2 +2 1 N − 45)
((2N2 − N +3 ) 2 − 9N3)(4N2 − 9)
< 0.
These signs establish that the optimal tariﬀ for signatories is higher when the monopolist chooses the
quantity but that, just as one might expect, the international price is lower. However, the quantity is
greater when the monopolist chooses the prices. This is explained by the fact that the national price in
the non-signatories’ countries is lower in that case, which compensates the eﬀect on the quantity of the
higher national price paid by the consumers of signatory countries.
Finally, we compare the payoﬀs of the players.
πQ − πp = −
(a − c)2N3A(N)
((2N2 − N +3 ) 2 − 9N2)2(4N2 − 9)2 < 0,
where
A(N)=6 4 N9 − 304N8 + 448N7 − 444N6 − 324N5 + 2763N4 − 3186N3







2((2N2 − N +3 ) 2 − 9N2)2(4N2 − 9)2 > 0,
9In the following expressions Q stands for the Stackelberg equilibrium when the monopolist chooses the quantity and p
for the Stackelberg equilibrium when the monopolist chooses the price.
25where
B(N)=6 4 N9 − 336N8 + 576N7 − 932N6 + 396N5 + 441N4 − 162N3




(a − c)2N2(8N3 − 26N2 +1 2 N − 18)
2((2N2 − N +3 ) 2 − 9N2)(4N2 − 9)
> 0.
These signs clearly allow us to conclude that a tariﬀ is going to be more advantageous for the importers
when the monopolist chooses the quantity than when it chooses the price. The rent-shifting hypothesis
works in both cases but in selecting the price, the monopolist can reduce the capacity of the importers
to appropriate part of the monopolist’s rent.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have studied the optimal trade policy for a foreign monopolist under integrated markets
distinguishing two cases. In one case we have assumed that the strategic variable of the monopolist
is the quantity and, in the other case, that the strategic variable is the price. We have also analyzed
whether cooperation among importers of the monopolized good through a tariﬀ agreement can improve
the welfare of the importers and whether this kind of agreement is stable. To assess the stability we have
modelled the tariﬀ agreement formation as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage each importer decides
whether or not to be part of the agreement and in the second stage the signatories and non-signatories
choose their tariﬀ whereas the monopoly chooses the quantity or the price. In the second stage we have
taken into account two more possibilities as well, that all the players take their decisions simultaneously
or that the signatories enjoy a ﬁrst movement advantage. Finally, we have assumed that the signing of
the agreement works as a commitment device to set up the tariﬀs stipulated by the agreement and that
this is open to the entrance of any country.
Our main ﬁndings stipulate that the optimal trade policy critically depends on the monopolist’s
strategic variable. In the case of a quantity-setting monopolist a tariﬀ is always advantageous for the
importers. However, in the case of a price-setting monopolist a tariﬀ is advantageous for the signatories
only when these enjoy a ﬁrst movement advantage. In this case the non-signatories always select a zero
26tariﬀ. The comparison of the two cases yields that a price policy reduces the capacity of the importers
to reap a part of the monopolist’s rent.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the maximum level of cooperation that can be reached by a self-
enforcing tariﬀ agreement is very low, in fact only an agreement consisting of three countries is self-
enforcing, and this result is independent of the strategic variable selected by the monopolist. Thus, we
ﬁnd that to enjoy a strategic advantage it is suﬃcient to guarantee the proﬁtability of a broad agreement
but it is not suﬃcient to guarantee its stability even assuming that the signing of the agreement implies
its full compliance.
There are several issues related to this research that could be addressed in the future. One is to
check whether the results hold when an ad valorem tariﬀ is used instead of a speciﬁc one. A second
issue could be to analyze what happens when the government of the exporting country has a more
active role. In particular, we could consider in a ﬁrst approach that the government gives support
to the monopolist through an export subsidy and in a second step to consider that the government
designs its optimal trade policy taking into account the welfare of its own consumers. Finally, we
have used in this paper a concept of stability that, among other things, does not consider the pos-
sibility of repeated interaction as occurs in the stability analysis of trade cooperation developed, for
instance, by Bagwell and Staiger (1990) or Riezman (1991) and more recently by Freund (2000) or Ed-
erington and McCalman (2003). Thus, extending our analysis to consider the possibility of repeated
interaction among the importing countries could be a third line of research to develop in the future.
A Proof of Proposition 1
First, we look for values of n that satisfy the internal stability condition that we rewrite as
4(n)=Ws(n) − Wf(n − 1) ≥ 0.
Using (28) and (29) we have that the welfare of the consumers of the signatory and non-signatories
countries are given by the following expressions
27Ws(n)=
N4 (a − c)
2
2((2N2 − N + n)
2 − N2n2)
,W f(n − 1) =
N2(N2 − 1)(a − c)
2 ¡
2N2 − N + n − 1
¢2
2((2N2 − N + n − 1)






((2N2 − N + n)2 − N2n2)((2N2 − N + n − 1)2 − N2(n − 1)2)2,
where
A(n)=a0(N)n4 + a1(N)n3 + a2(N)n2 + a3(N)n + a4(N)
and the coeﬃcients of the polynomial are
a0(N)=N6 − N4 − N2 +1> 0 for N ≥ 2,
a1(N)=−2(4N6 − N5 − N4 − N3 − 4N2 +2 N +1 )< 0 for N ≥ 2,
a2(N)=−(4N8 − 4N7 − 21N6 +6 N5 − 4N4 +2 0 N3 +2 N2 − 6N − 1) < 0 for N ≥ 3,
a3(N)=2 N(8N7 − 8N6 − 8N5 − 6N4 +1 1 N3 +5 N2 − 3N − 1) > 0 for N ≥ 2,
a4(N)=−N2(8N6 − 23N4 +6 N3 +1 2 N2 − 2N − 2) < 0 for N ≥ 2.
Then given that (2N2 − N + n)2 − N2n2 > 0 for n ≤ N the sign of the internal stability condition
depends on the sign of polynomial A(n).
According to Descartes’ rule of signs the polynomial can have three or one positive real roots. Next,
we show that in this case A(n)=0presents three positive real roots that we will call n1,n 2 and n3.
Firstly, we calculate the following values for the polynomial
A(1) = N2(1 − 6N +1 5 N2 − 22N3 +2 1 N4 − 12N5 +4 N6) > 0 for N ≥ 1,
A(3) = 36 − 60N + 101N2 − 94N3 +6 3 N4 − 42N5 +2 9 N6 − 12N7 +4 N8 > 0 for N ≥ 0,
A(4) = 144 − 168N + 202N2 − 150N3 +1 2 N4 − 22N5 +3 9 N6 − 8N8 < 0 for N ≥ 2.
The sign of these values allows us to conclude that A(n) has three positive real roots since the polynomial
28presents ﬁrst positive values and subsequently negative values.10 Then we can also conclude that n1 <
1, 3 <n 2 < 4 and 4 <n 3.
Now, we calculate
A(N)=N2 − 7N4 +4 N5 +1 6 N6 − 20N7 − 2N8 +1 2 N9 − 2N10 < 0 for N ≥ 4,
which allows us to establish that N<n 3 and consequently that A(n) is negative for n =4 ,5,...,N for
N ≥ 4.
The following graphical representation illustrates the behaviour of polynomial A(n) for N =1 0 .
=⇒ Figure ⇐=
In this case n1 =0 .648,n 2 =3 .361 and n3 =2 1 .012. What we have just shown is that this shape is
the same for any N ≥ 4 and that n1 < 1, 3 <n 2 < 4 and N<n 3 also for N ≥ 4.
Then for n =4 ,...,N as A(n) is negative, the internal stability condition is not satisﬁed. Now, we
check the external stability condition for n =2 ,3. For n =3 , the external stability condition can be
written as Wf(3) − Ws(4) ≥ 0. We know that the internal stability condition is not satisﬁed for n =4 ,
i.e., that Ws(4)−Wf(3) < 0. Multiplying by −1 we get Wf(3)−Ws(4) > 0. Thus, we can conclude that
both the external and internal stability conditions are satisﬁed for n =3and, consequently, that a TA
consisting of three countries is stable.
Finally, we check whether this is the case for n =2 . We know that for n =3Ws(3) − Wf(2) > 0
which yields Wf(2) − Ws(3) < 0 which means that the external stability condition is not satisﬁed and
that a TA of two countries is not stable.
Summarizing, we have shown that for N ≥ 4 the unique stable agreement consists of three countries.
For the case of N =3it is easy to check that the grand coalition is also the unique self-enforcing
agreement. The particular case of N =2is analyzed in the main text.
10Notice that the independent term of the polynomial is negative. This means that ﬁr s tw eh a v en e g a t i v ev a l u e s ,a f t e r
that positive values and again negative values to ﬁnish with positive values since a0(N) is positive. As such the polynomial
must cut the horizontal axis three times.
29B The Linear Case: An Example with Two Countries
If two countries with linear demand functions: qi =( 1 /bi)(ai − p − ti),i =1 ,2, sign the agreement the















































where the left-hand side can be interpreted as the marginal beneﬁto ft h et a r i ﬀ for country i and the
right-hand side as the marginal cost. For the case of N =2 ,∂ p / ∂ t 1 = −b2/2(b1 + b2) and ∂p/∂t2 =
−b1/2(b1 + b2). Then by substitution in the F.O.C. we obtain
1
2(b1 + b2)
((a1 − p)b2 +( a2 − p)b1)=t1,
1
2(b1 + b2)
((a1 − p)b2 +( a2 − p)b1)=t2.
The result is that, taking into account the eﬀects of the tariﬀ in the price, the marginal welfare is identical
for all the signatories so that the tariﬀs must be the same.
C Proof of Proposition 3
First, we look for values of n that satisfy the internal stability condition that we rewrite as
4(n)=Ws(n) − Wf(n − 1) ≥ 0.





2,W f(n − 1) =
2(a − c)
2 N4








2 (4N2 − (n − 1)2)
2,
30where
A(n)=n4 − 4n3 − 2(2N2 − 3)n2 +4 ( 4 N2 − 1)n − 8N2 +1 ,
so that the sign of the internal stability condition depends on the sign of polynomial A(n).
According to Descartes’ rule of signs the polynomial can have three or one positive real roots. Next,
we show that in this case A(n)=0presents three positive real roots that we will call n1,n 2 and n3.
Firstly, we calculate the following values for the polynomial
A(1) = 4N2 > 0,A (3) = 4N2 +1 6> 0,A (4) = 81 − 8N2 < 0 for N ≥ 3.
The sign of these values allows us to conclude that A(n) has three positive real roots since the polynomial
presents ﬁrst positive values and subsequently negative values.11 Then we can also conclude that n1 <
1, 3 <n 2 < 4 and 4 <n 3.
Now, we calculate
A(N)=−3N4 +1 2 N3 − 2N2 − 4N +1< 0 for N ≥ 4,
which allows us to establish that N<n 3 and consequently that A(n) is negative for n =4 ,5,...,N for
N ≥ 4.
From this point the proof follows step by step the development of the proof of Prop. 1. For this reason
we ﬁnish here the proof of Prop. 3, only to add that now for N =2as we have that Ws(2) >W s(1) the
agreement of the two countries will be stable in any case.
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